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INTRODUCTION
For the 2019–20 National Basketball Association season, the
Golden State Warriors are set to leave their current home of Oracle Arena
in Oakland to move across the bay to the brand-new Chase Center in San
Francisco.1 True to the ethos of their Silicon Valley backgrounds, the
Warriors’ ownership implemented an innovative financing mechanism to
assist their move. The Warriors organization references this financing
scheme as a “‘membership’ program.”2 This program is synonymous with
what previous sports franchises referred to as a “Personal Seat License”
(“PSL”) agreement.3 In essence, the Warriors solicited their rabid and
*J.D. The University of Illinois College of Law 2020
1
Jim Harrington, Golden State Warriors unveil stunning new arena in
San Francisco, THE MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.mercurynew
s.com/2019/08/26/golden-state-warriors-unveil-new-amazing-new-arena-in-sanfrancisco-photos/.
2
Al Saracevic, Warriors Reveal Long-Term Chase Center Season-Ticket
Plan, S.F. CHRON. (July 19, 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/sports/article/
Warriors-new-offer-Season-tickets-for-30-years-11300137.php.
3
Martin J. Greenberg & M’Kenzee Galloway, Personal Seat Licenses in the
NBA: Golden State Warriors, GREENBERG L. OFFICES (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.greenberglawoffice.com/personal-seat-licenses/#_ftn83.
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wealthy fanbase to help with the costs of constructing this new arena. Of
note, Bruce Schoenfeld of the New York Times speculates that this decision
was not made on a whim but rather has been in the works for quite some
time as he claims:4 “Once Warriors’ owners Joe Lacob and Peter Guber
decided their team needed a new arena, in San Francisco – and they
seemingly made that decision before they bought the team in 2010 – they
also knew who would pay for it: the fans.”5
Within the new Chase Center, 12,000 of the available 18,064 seats
for Warriors’ home games will be set aside for purchasers of the Warriors’
PSL membership.6 For most seats the membership fee for the Warriors’
PSL reported to be $15,000.7 Although, for some select seats this fee
reported as being as high as $35,000.8 Moreover, this fee for the
membership is for the right to purchase a season ticket and is not
incorporated in the “actual cost of the season ticket.”9 The price of the
actual tickets reported to be $600 per seat, which amounts to $26,400 for
the season.10 The Warriors’ PSL offering is further unlike previously
implemented PSLs, differing in a few key respects. The general nature of
the Warriors’ PSLs offering is that it requires “season-ticket buyers to pay
a one-time fee that will enable you to buy your seats for 30 years.”11
4

Bruce Schoenfeld, What Happened When Venture Capitalists Took
Over the Golden State Warriors, THE N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 30, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/magazine/what-happened-when-venturecapitalists-took-over-the-golden-state-warriors.html?searchResultPosition=1.
5
Id.
6
Ron Leuty, How the Warriors Shift the Ticket Lineup to Deliver
‘the Right Value’, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Jun. 22, 2018),
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/06/22/golden-statewarriors-season-tickets-chase-oracle.html.
7
Id.
8
Scott Ostler, Warriors’ New Arena Gives Some Season-Ticket Holders
Sticker shock, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/sports/
ostler/article/Warriors-new-arena-gives-some-season-12720962.php?psid=ixvj.
9
Patrick Murray, Just How Lucrative Will the Chase Center Be For The
Warriors, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickmurray/
2018/09/09/just-how-lucrative-will-the-chase-center-be-for-thewarriors/#53b634102b29.
10
See Ostler, supra note 8.
11
Scott Polacek, Warriors’ Season Tickets to Require Fans to Buy 30Year Membership at New Arena, BLEACHER REP. (July 19, 2017),
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2722678-warriors-season-tickets-to-requirefans-to-buy-30-year-membership-at-new-arena.
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The first of these differences in the Warriors’ PSL from previous
PSL arrangements is a “refund.” “In a unique twist yet to be used in any
pro sport, the Warriors promise to pay back that fee after 30 years.”12
Arguably, though, this refund does more for the Warriors from a public
relations standpoint than function as offering its fans a true refund.13 For
after being “[a]djusted for inflation, that money won’t be worth much
down the road.”14 A dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow.15
A dollar today is worth much more than a dollar in thirty years.16
This article will focus on how this second key difference
implemented in the Warriors’ PSL would affect an eventual bankruptcy
proceeding of a purchaser into their “membership program.” In the event
of a purchaser filing for bankruptcy liquidation under chapter seven of the
bankruptcy code, the PSL will join the rest of the bankrupt’s assets in
becoming property of the now-bankrupt purchaser’s creditors estate.
Purchasers into the Warriors’ offering can be either individuals or
corporations. This article will provide an analysis of how the debtor, estate,
and team will likely fare in terms of recouping the value of the PSL as an
asset in the event of a purchaser’s liquidation in bankruptcy.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Rise of the National Basketball Association

Following the turn of the millennium in the year 2000, the
National Basketball Association (“NBA”) and its franchises saw a
tremendous ascension in terms of their financial value. The most recent
NBA franchise sold were the Houston Rockets, in 2017, selling for what
currently holds as a record $2.2 billion.17 In context, the Miami Heat sold
12

See Saracevic, supra note 2.
Id.
14
Rick Welts, Golden State Warriors Season Tickets Will Require a 30
Year PSL Agreement at Chase Center, FROMTHISSEAT.COM, http://www.fromth
isseat.com/index.php/blog/19863-golden-state-warriors-season-tickets-willrequire-a-30-year-psl- agreement-at-chase-center (last visited Feb. 6, 2020).
15
Nick Lioudis, Time Value of Money and the Dollar, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/032715/why-does-time-valuemoney-tvm-assume-dollar-today-worth-more-dollar-tomorrow.asp (last updated
Apr. 18, 2018).
16
Id.
17
Tim Cato, How much did each NBA owner pay to buy their teams?,
SB NATION (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.sbnation.com/nba/2017/9/5/16255168
/nba-teams-sold-highest-record-price-all-30.
13
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for only $68 million in 1995.18 This ascension enjoyed throughout the
league has commonly been attributed to a few factors. First, the
introduction of streaming services such as Netflix, Hulu, and, Amazon
Prime among others placed a heavy premium on cable providers’ ability
to broadcast “event” television.19 Watching an NBA basketball game live
became considered as within the bucket of “event” television.20 For, it is
an utterly different experience to watch a television show such as
“Scandal” or “NCIS” subsequent to the original broadcast than it is to
watch a replay of a National Basketball game. Broadcasters responded to
consumers ascribing value in experiencing unscripted live events, such as
sports games, as they happen in real-time.21
Second, the creation of social media platforms, most notably,
Twitter, created a community where fans communicate with friends or
even strangers in the conversation taking place online considering a live
game they are watching.22 Fans, journalists, and NBA players came to
commonly refer to this medium as NBA Twitter.23 Where fans “watch
games together and comment on news, highlights, and roster moves.”24
This affected not only increased enthusiasm over the actual gameplay but
also interest in team management and transactions in the offseason. The
NBA capitalized on social media to a higher degree than any other
American professional sports league.25 “The NBA is the most-tweetedabout sports league in 2018, according to Twitter, with more than 100
million NBA-related tweets heading into the NBA finals.”26 This was no
accident as other “leagues such as the NFL and Major League Baseball
have gone after sites and social media users who have posted video
without permission, the NBA took the opposite approach.”27 Adam Silver,
18

Id.
Meg James, The Rise of sports TV costs and why your cable bill keeps
going up, LOS ANGELES T IMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/busines
s/hollywood/la-fi-ct-sports-channels-20161128-story.html.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Rick Maese, NBA Twitter: A sports bar that doesn’t close, where the
stars pull up a seat next to you, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2018/05/31/nba-twitter-asports-bar-that-doesnt-close-where-the-stars-pull-up-a-seat-next-to-you/.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
19
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the NBA’s commissioner, contrarily took the position that he “considers
online videos to be a form of marketing. He likens them to ‘snacks’ that
might whet fans’ appetites for something bigger.”28
Additionally, the players of the NBA, likely as a byproduct of
growing up in the social media world, sought out to build themselves as
being synonymous with a recognizable and positive brand.29 Omar Raja,
founder of the House Highlights Instagram account, commented that
“what separates the NBA from the other leagues is the personalities,
accessibility, and relatability. Even if NBA players have wildly different
incomes and lifestyles than their fans, they live in the same online
community.”30 Players such as LeBron James and Stephen Curry
transcended basketball to become some of the biggest household celebrity
names in the world. These stars transcended basketball even to use their
platform to become a powerful voice in social justice issues. As one
example, “Miami Heat star Dwyane Wade, who has 8 million followers,
tweeted about the victims of the Parkland, Fla., school shooting in
February, a post that received 538,000 likes and 155,000 retweets.”31
Gone are the days of NBA players bringing firearms into the
locker rooms.32 It very well may be the case that the public relations staff
of the NBA simply did their jobs well. In some respect it is of importance
to the NBA’s rise that it has mostly avoided the issues that recently
plagued the image of the National Football League (NFL) stemming from
players consistently engaging in domestic violence, kneeling during the
national anthem, and the increasing evidence of the long-term effects from
suffering numerous concussions.33
B. Recent Success of the Golden State Warriors
In 1975, the Warriors won their first championship as tenants of
Oracle Arena.34 In the following thirty years, however, the Warriors and
28

Id.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Jianna West, Gilbert Arenas Details 2009 Gun Showdown With
Javaris
Crittenton,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(Aug.
7,
2018),
https://www.si.com/nba/2018/08/07/gilbert-arenas-card-game-guns-detailsjavaris-crittenton-wizards.
33
PBS NEWS HOUR, Tumultuous year for NFL marked by protests,
injuries and a ratings drop (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/sho
w/tumultuous-year-for-nfl-marked-by-protests-injuries-and-a-ratings-drop.
34
Bruce Schoenfeld, What Happened When Venture Capitalists Took
Over the Golden State Warriors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016),
29
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their fans saw little success as the franchise mostly fell into irrelevance;
“This wasn’t just a bad team, but a team that seemed permanently stuck in
a state of irrelevance.”35 This irrelevance would quickly no longer be the
case after the Golden State Warriors changed ownership in 2010, when Joe
Lacob and Peter Guber purchased the Golden State Warriors for a reported
$450 million.36 Which, at the time, was thought of as a price “wildly
excessive by nearly everyone.”37 Yet, in the Warriors “Lacob saw a startup disguised as an underperforming business, a sports franchise that had
been run autocratically – and therefore ineptly – as the industry evolved
around it.”38
Whether Lacob and Gruber knew at the time is unclear, but they
soon realized they had been dealt the equivalent of a pair of Aces. Just a
year prior to their purchase, Warriors in the 2009 NBA draft selected a
future superstar in Stephen Curry.39 Curry became one of the best and most
popular players in the history of the league.40 Within the next three years,
the Warriors would only add to their roster in drafting two more remarkable
players in Klay Thompson and Draymond Green.41 With these three
superstars at the helm, in 2015, the Warriors won their first championship
in exactly thirty years.42 The franchise that was recently considered mostly
irrelevant was now suddenly one of the preeminent franchises within the
entire NBA.43 The Warriors mystique soon rose to even greater heights
when they made the addition of another superstar in Kevin Durant.44 The
Warriors have since won subsequent titles in 2017 and 2018.45 As of the
writing of this article, the Warriors are in first place in the Western
Conference heading into the postseason and appear poised to win another

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/magazine/what-happened-when-venturecapitalists-took-over-the-golden-state-warriors.html.
35
Id.
36
Cato, supra note 17.
37
Schoenfeld, supra note 34.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Jason Parham, The Warriors and the Myth of the Silicon Valley-Driven
Team, WIRED (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/warriors-siliconvalley/.
44
Id.
45
Schoenfeld, supra note 34.
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title in the 2019 season.46 Today, Forbes estimates the value of the Golden
State Warriors franchise at 4.3 billion.47
Consequently, ticket prices for a seat at a Warriors home game
skyrocketed since 2014-15. For season ticket holders during the 2014-15
season, the price range for a single ticket was $18 and $450.48 For the
2017-18 season, these prices rose to $40 and $715.49 As for the secondary
market (fans purchasing tickets on the likes of sellers such as stubhub.com
instead of directly from the team), the average listing price for the 20142015 season was $122.50 Thus far, in the 2018-19 season, the median
listing price on one of these indexes is $463.51 These prices are based upon
the Oracle Arena having nearly 20,000 seats.52 The Chase Center will
provide less supply for the demand by having a total of 18,000 seats.53
Basic economics suggests that the price of entry for a Warriors’ home
game at their new arena will only grow. However, this is subject to change.
The Warriors’ current success in terms of selling season and single-game
tickets at the moment “doesn’t mean that someone else will want them ten
years from now.”54
C. History of PSL Use by Sports Franchises
The origins of sports franchises employing the financing
mechanism of the PSL arises from the late 1980’s, when Max Muhleman
and George Shinn set out to bring an NBA expansion team to Charlotte,
46

NBA Standings 2019-20, ESPN (last visited Apr. 7, 2019),
http://www.espn.com/nba/standings.
47
The Business of Basketball, FORBES, (last visited Feb. 17, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/nba-valuations/list/#tab:overall.
48
Darren Rovell, Warriors Raising Ticket Prices Again, ESPN (Feb. 7,
2017), https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/18636756/golden-state-warriorsraising-ticket-prices-again.
49
Id.
50
Prices For Warriors Tickets On Secondary Market Remain Steady
Following Back-to-Back Championships, TICKETIQ BLOG (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://blog.ticketiq.com/blog/2018-19-golden-state-warriors-tickets-pricesschedule.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Al Saracevic, Warriors Reveal Long-Term Chase Center SeasonTicket Plan, S.F. CHRON. (July, 19 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/sports/ar
ticle/Warriors-new-offer-Season-tickets-for-30-years-11300137.php.
54
Golden State Warriors Season Tickets Will Require A 30 Year PSL
Agreement At Chase Center, FROMTHISSEAT.COM, (last visited Feb. 17, 2020),
http://www.fromthisseat.com/index.php/blog/19863-golden-state-warriorsseason-tickets-will-require-a-30-year-psl- agreement-at-chase-center.
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North Carolina.55 The original idea of Muhleman and Shinn was that
“future fans would put down a non-refundable deposit of about 10% of
what the cost of the season tickets would be to get on a season ticket
waiting list.”56 Charlotte eventually brought an NBA expansion franchise
partially due to the help of this unique financing scheme.57 Muhleman then
decided to give those fans “ownership of their seat as a gift to make them
feel more part of the team, and he called these gifts Charter Seat Rights.”58
Importantly, “fans were also allowed to assign their rights to anyone if
they chose not to renew their season tickets.”59 Of note, “Muhleman
never himself considered that Charter Seat Rights could be used as a
financing tool, or that fans could sell them for a profit, until he saw an ad
in a local newspaper.”60
From this initial success in implementing a PSL financing scheme
by a sports franchise, Muhleman would use a similar scheme four years
later when he partnered with Jerry Richardson to bring an National
Football League (“NFL”) franchise to Charlotte.61 Since then, numerous
NFL teams followed suit and employed PSL’s in financing not only
expansion franchises, but also for construction of new stadiums for existing
franchises.62 Outside of the NFL, though, PSLs have not been in wide use.
The notable exceptions being the owners of the Toronto franchises using
them for the NBA Raptors and NHL Maple Leave.63 Some speculated that
the PSL saw wider use in the NFL because “purchasing season tickets is not
as big of an obligation. NFL season ticket packages are limited to only 8
regular season home games each season.”64 As applied to the NBA, “For a
41 home game basketball season, a personal seat license is a much larger
obligation which is why the Golden State Warriors are the first team to
experiment with this system.”65 The success that the Warriors enjoined,
55

Greenberg & Galloway, supra note 3.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Rick Welts, Golden State Warriors Season Tickets Will Require A 30
Year PSL Agreement At Chase Center, http://www.fromthisseat.com/index.php/b
log/19863-golden-state-warriors-season-tickets-will-require-a-30-year-pslagreement-at-chase-center.
65
Id.
56
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however, will likely result in PSLs becoming more prevalent in the
financing operations of NBA teams.
D. Current Demographics of the Bay Area
One of the consequences of the Warriors’ massive success in the
2010s has been the many Bay Area residents jumping onto the
“bandwagon” into newly fashioned Warriors fandom. What it means to be
a Bay Area resident in terms of demographics—and subsequently for
many a Warriors “fan”—is much different in the post-2010s than what it
had been when the Warriors first entered Oracle Arena in 1975.66 Prior to
the dotcom boom of the early 2000s, the Bay Area was viewed simply as
the compilation of neighborhoods surrounding San Francisco. Back then,
San Francisco was just “a small city of around 825,000 poised on the tip
of a peninsular on America’s western edge that sprang up during the 1840s
gold rush.67 Within the past two decades, though, the Bay Area underwent
dramatic change. Millennial entrepreneurs flooded the area as a
consequence of massive increase in the availability of venture capital
funding throughout the area.68 Resultingly, “San Francisco has become the
hype- and capital-fuelled [sic] epicentre [sic] of America’s technology
industry, which has traditionally centred [sic] on the string of suburban
cities known as Silicon Valley.”69 To the longstanding inhabitants of San
Francisco that have been there for generations, this drastic change to the
demographics of the community has “led to a city that some of its residents
find unrecognizable.”70 These new “people moving in are more likely to
have higher levels of formal education, and they tend to be younger, white
and Asian . . . The result is a city that is younger, more educated, [and]
richer [by the year.]”71
Another prevalent feature of the new Bay Area is the amount of
well-funded startup companies in the area. These startup companies play

66
Michelle Robertson, New Census Data: San Francisco Getting Richer,
More Crowded, SF GATE (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/expensivesan-francisco/article/median-income-sf-demographics-rent-price-census13491703.php.
67
Zoe Corbyn, Is San Francisco Losing Its Soul?, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb. 23, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/is-sanfrancisco-losing-its-soul.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Dan Kopf, Quantifying the Changing Face of San Francisco,
PRICEONOMICS (May 5, 2016), https://priceonomics.com/quantifying-thechanging-face-of-san-francisco/.
71
Id.
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a key role in the purchasing of Warriors’ tickets.72 The abundance of these
companies combined with the limited nature of available seating for a
Warriors home game made Warriors tickets the hottest commodity in
town.73 Many of these startups are “software as a service” (SAAS)
companies whose business models are reliant upon large scale companies
contracting for use of their services.74 In turn, these companies have to
cater to the interests of executives at these corporations in order for them
to engage with their companies’ offering. For the most part, it is more
attractive to these executives to receive an offer to attend a Warriors’ game
than it is to attend that of the San Francisco Giants. The baseball season
contains many more home games, and the cost of entry is significantly less
expensive.75 The same is true upon consideration of the San Francisco
49ers. The 49ers have considerably less mystique than that of the Warriors
and much higher low-cost ticket availability. The Bay Area also offers
numerous high-quality restaurant options; making a dinner at one of them
less interesting. These startups in large part are competing with one
another. If one of your competitors is offering Warriors’ tickets, your hand
is essentially forced. The necessity for Bay Area startups in purchasing
Warriors’ tickets in order to entertain potential clients plays a significant
role in the desire for these Warriors’ tickets with the opening of the brandnew Chase Center.
E. Part 5: Prevalence of American Bankruptcy
In the absence of the occurrence of an unforeseen event such as
the recession of the late 2000s, only a minority of membership purchasers
will eventually enter bankruptcy during the pendency of the agreement. In
2017, 0.235%, (772,594), of the American population filed for
bankruptcy.76 However, 0.235% taken year over year for a thirty-year
period, suddenly becomes a much more prevalent issue. Moreover, in the

72

Schoenfeld, supra note 4.
Id.
74
Id.
75
New York Giants Tickets, SEATGEEK (last visited Feb. 18 2020),
https://seatgeek.com/new-york-giants-tickets; see also Golden State Warriors
Tickets, SEATGEEK (last visited Feb. 18 2020), https://seatgeek.com/golden-statewarriors-tickets.
76
June 2017 Bankruptcy Filings Down 2.8 Percent, U.S. COURTS (July
21, 2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/07/21/june-2017-bankruptcyfilings-down-28-percent.
73
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post-recession period of 2011, this number was double than what occurred
in 2017 with 1,417,236 bankruptcies.77
It is impossible to know how analogous the Warriors’ membership
purchasers are in terms of likelihood of bankruptcy compared to the
American public as a whole. Logically, citizens of the Bay Area who can
afford these tickets seemingly have a significantly larger net worth than
the typical American and thus a further distance from bankruptcy.78 Yet,
most of these purchasers are likely part of the “new-money” community
that made their fortunes off of companies that for now are seen as
innovative but are not certain to be viewed in the same light in the future.
These individuals also likely possess a lack of experience in maintaining
such affluence.79 It may seem on the surface that due to the wealth in the
Bay Area region that bankruptcy statistics would be lesser than the
averages within the United States as a whole. However, the validity of this
assumption seems unclear in light of these unique characteristics that are
tied to the wealth accumulated in the Bay Area.
The identity of these purchasers is unknown as they have not been
made public. Yet, it is safe to assume that in addition to individual
purchasers that a significant portion of purchasers is the technology-based
startup companies themselves. The volatility in solvency becomes further
magnified when considering the companies themselves. 25,227 businesses
went bankrupt in America in 2017.80 A corporation signing onto a thirtyyear agreement assumes that in thirty years that corporation will still be in
existence. By nature, this is a gamble. Some of these member corporations
will go bankrupt and have an effect on the Warriors’ plans. Factors such
as the possibility of another company producing a product that leaves theirs
obsolete or failing to live up to ideological promises are a common
occurrence in the Silicon Valley. The recent outing of the fraud behind one
of the most discussed Silicon Valley companies in Theranos perhaps is the

77

Just the Facts: Consumer Bankruptcy Filings, 2006 -2017, U.S.
COURTS (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2018/03/07/just-factsconsumer-bankruptcy-filings-2006-2017.
78
Leanna Garfield, Striking maps reveal the huge wealth gap between
San Francisco and the rest of the country, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 25, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/weath-maps-cities-san-francisco-bay-area2018-3.
79
Alejandra Reyes-Velarde, Here’s why San Francisco isn’t the best
place to work for a startup, BIZJOURNALS (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2017/08/09/sf-cost-of-livingdissuades-startup-owners.html.
80

June 2017 Bankruptcy Filings Down 2.8 Percent, supra note 76.
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best example of this latter scenario.81 Resultingly from the Theranos
scandal having such public significance, the “fake it until you make it”
mentality of Silicon Valley startups is subject to more scrutiny now than
ever before.
II.

PRECEDENT

In 1924, Chief Justice Taft delivered a landmark Supreme Court
bankruptcy decision in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Johnson.82 The
facts of the case were that one of the members of the Chicago Board of
Trade and the corporation—he was President of both—filed for
bankruptcy.83 Under the rules of the Board, a member was subject to the
same obligations and discipline as was their corporation.84 The rules of the
Board membership provided that for the purpose of securing payment on
obligations, any member of the Board could “prevent the transfer of the
membership of the debtor member by filing objection to such transfer with
the Directors.”85 The bankrupt’s now defunct company was “indebted to
thirty or more members of the Exchange on its contracts in an aggregate
amount of more than $60,000.”86 Due to the bankrupt’s failure to make
good on his company’s defaulted contracts, other board members that were
creditors of the company filed an objection to the transfer.87 These member
creditors ultimately petitioned to the Supreme Court that the bankruptcy
trustee’s ability to sell the seat as an asset of the estate was conditioned on
the prior payment of the $60,000 owed to them.88 As of the bankruptcy
filing, the free and clear membership seat was valued at $10,500.89
Upon a filing for bankruptcy, all non-exempt property of the
bankrupt becomes property of the estate, which consists of the collective
creditors of the now bankrupt.90 The Court first held that “[t]he
81
Tony Echols, Three Tough Leadership Lessons We Learned From The
Theranos Scandal, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forb
escoachescouncil/2019/04/17/three-tough-leadership-lessons-we-learned- fromthe-theranos-scandal/#24ff83c74cc2.
82
Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
83
Id. at 7.
84
Id. at 8.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 7.
87
Id. at 8.
88
Id. at 1–2.
89
Id. at 8.
90
Id. at 12–13.
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membership is property, in a way attached to the person of the bankrupt
and disposable only by his will. It follows him, therefore, into the
bankruptcy court . . . ”91 Thus, “[b]y operation of the bankrupt law, the
membership passes, subject to the rules of the exchange, to the trustee, for
his disposition of it. The trustee does not become a member, but he does
come into control of the bankrupt’s right to dispose of the membership . .
. ”92 The Court ultimately held for these petitioners as it proclaimed that
the rights the trustee obtained in the seat were of the same nature as was
held by the bankrupt; “[h]e can transfer or sell it, subject to a right of his
creditors to prevent his transfer or sale till he settles with them, a right in
some respects similar to the typical lien of the common law . . . ”93 The
Court further stated,
The preference of the member creditors is not created
after bankruptcy. The lien, if it can be called such, is
inherent in the property in its creation, and can be asserted
at any time before actual transfer. Indeed, the danger of
bankruptcy of the member is perhaps the chief reason, and
a legitimate one, for creating the lien.94
For the Warrior’s PSL, the importance of this holding is that the
trustee would gain no superior rights as had the debtor in terms of the
contract, which now became property of the estate.95 Under this holding,
a contract for membership to a board of trade and membership to a
program allowing purchase of season tickets are of the same validity in
being considered as an asset.96 The contractual conditions that the asset is
subject to though continue to hold as the right to it passes to the bankruptcy
trustee.97
In 1996, the Ninth Circuit in In re Harrell then considered whether
a now bankrupt’s season ticket agreement that contained the opportunity
to renew season tickets for the Phoenix Suns in following seasons was a
property right that passed to the estate as a consequence of the bankruptcy
filing.98 The Ninth Circuit held that “the opportunity to renew season
tickets is not a property right under Arizona law.”99 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
91
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found the season ticket agreement to be of inconsequential value to the
estate.100 As such, it once more became the property of the bankrupt.101
The court found of particular relevance that the Suns made “it clear in
written notices sent to season ticket holders each year that the ‘opportunity
[to renew season tickets] is a privilege granted by the SUNS and may be
withdrawn in the SUNS’ discretion.’”102 It additionally took into account
that the season ticket agreement stated that “while the SUNS will exercise
reasonable efforts to maintain renewal privileges, season ticket holders are
not guaranteed this opportunity.”103 Moreover, the court considered that
“even if the high probability of renewal of season tickets does add to the
salable value of a season ticket account, ‘the addition would represent a
speculation on chance, not a legal right.’”104
In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Board of Trade of City of
Chicago v. Johnson, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 1996 in In Re Harrell
seems to have been made in error. Here, the Ninth Circuit committed two
distinct flaws in error. First, it seemingly ignored the holding of Board of
Trade of City of Chicago v. Johnson as well as another Supreme Court
holding in the case of Butner v. United States.105 In these cases, the
Supreme Court defined the interrelationship between federal bankruptcy
law and state law.106 The Supreme Court established that what comprises
the property of the estate is first decided by federal bankruptcy law.107
Eleven U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code further codifies this
notion as it provides that on the instance of a bankruptcy filing that a
creditors’ estate is automatically created.108 This estate is comprised of “all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.”109 State law then, as a subsequent matter,
addresses the concern of defining the attributes of the property interest in
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question.110 The Supreme Court recognized this procedure in Butner v.
United States where it stated that the second step is defining the “property
interests . . . created and defined by state law.”111 Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit also erred in its analysis of the state law attributes the season ticket
agreement entailed. Despite all of these considerations, the Ninth Circuit
has not indicated that it believes In Re Harrell to be of non-binding
precedent.
In regard to the first error made by the Ninth Circuit, a season
ticket plan is essentially a membership. By purchasing a season ticket plan
offered by a team, a buyer in effect becomes a member of the team’s
season ticket program. In Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Johnson,
the Supreme Court stated that a “membership is property.”112 Thus, in In
Re Harrell, the season tickets should have automatically passed to the
trustee upon the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy.113 At that moment, the
trustee, on behalf of the estate, should have become the rightful owner of
the season ticket agreement. The trustee resultingly should have gained the
opportunity to decide whether it had value as an asset of the estate. The
Suns, or alternatively the debtor, should have then been obligated to file a
motion to the court if he or she desired the tickets be deemed of
inconsequential value. Importantly, either of these parties (and importantly
not the trustee) would hold the burden of proving that the agreement was
of inconsequential value to the estate.114
As to the latter error, because contract interpretation is a matter of
state law and the Phoenix Suns are located in Arizona, the Ninth Circuit
correctly applied Arizona law.115 Yet, the Ninth Circuit misunderstood the
underlying nature of season ticket agreements with sports teams. The
Ninth Circuit mistakenly relied on the holding of a distinguishable Arizona
Court of Appeals case, where the contracting conditions fastened to the
agreement were entirely distinguishable from what was under
consideration in In Re Harrell.116 In that case, the court did not recognize
the expectation of a lease renewal as an asset because “the underlying land
[had been] taken [by condemnation] by the state.”117 As a reminder, the
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pertinent issue is whether a trustee can recoup value from selling the asset.
The Ninth Circuit failed to realize that there is a clear distinction between
a season ticket agreement with a sports team and a lease for land that has
already been condemned by the state. The Ninth Circuit should not have
found these two circumstances synonymous. Furthermore, all of the
additional cases cited by the Ninth Circuit focus on landlord-tenant
relationships, in which the landlords have revocable powers.118 The legal
rights and duties ascribed to landlord-tenant relationships are entirely
different from season ticket purchasers and sports team relationships.
The trustee would likely see value in the agreement for the right
to specific seats during a Phoenix Suns home game. This is a different
scenario than the potential value to be gained from condemned land. The
ultimate buyer of the ticket, however, would have to be made aware of the
risk that the Suns might not renew. But, it is likely that the market would
provide such a buyer with other options that would make it worth the risk
that the Suns might, for some reason, not honor the renewal. The court
found that the trustee was never able to find such a buyer.119 It is unclear
if the Suns maintained any sort of waitlist for these tickets. Yet, in the
current case of the Warriors, it is public information that there is currently
a 43,000 person-long waitlist for the Warriors’ membership.120 Thus, there
certainly would be value in having priority consideration over the rest of
the waitlist.
Lastly, it should be noted that despite the factual similarities arising
from the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Reiser v. Dayton Country Club (In Re
Magness), the case would not apply as persuasive authority here.121 The
Sixth Circuit in In Re Magness considered whether a trustee could sell a
golf club membership that was conditioned on a non-assignability
clause.122 If the condition could have been removed, the asset would have
had considerable value to the estate due to the club’s long waitlist.123 The
analysis in the case, though, was based on the court’s classification of the
agreement as an executory contract.124 The court found that “the contracts
118
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creating the complex relationships among the parties and others are not in
any way commercial. They create personal relationships among
individuals who play golf, who are waiting to play golf, who eat together,
swim and play together. They are personal contracts.”125 The Sixth Circuit,
thus, essentially categorized the contracts as personal service agreements
that the club renews to its members who paid their fee.126 Consequently,
the agreement was classified as an executory contract because both parties
still had ongoing material obligations.127
The Warriors’ only ongoing obligation in their PSL agreement is to
pay a refund thirty years in the future.128 The team does not provide a
service beyond allowing a person the ability to purchase season tickets.129
The PSL itself does not commit the Warriors to any further obligation.130
The purchaser, in addition, still has to affirmatively buy season tickets that
would be subject to a separate agreement.131 Even if the actual season ticket
agreement was included in the initial PSL, a court would be unlikely to
classify allowing entry to a sporting event as an ongoing obligation that is
akin to a personal service agreement. Moreover, the purchaser is not
obligated to purchase the tickets every year, but is simply given the
opportunity to do so if they so choose.132 Based on these facts, it is unlikely
that a court would classify the Warriors PSL as an ongoing executory
contract.
III.

ANALYSIS

As a California-based sports franchise, the Golden State Warriors
fall within the scope of the Ninth Circuit. Yet, even if the Ninth Circuit were
to maintain that its holding in In Re Harrell was sound, in spite of Chicago
Board of Trade & Butner, the circumstances of the Warriors’ offering is
distinguishable from those considered in In Re Harrell. Under the
Warriors’ membership plan, “Members will receive the right to buy a
specific season ticket location for each year of the membership term.
Memberships will be available on a per seat basis.”133 In contrast to the
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facts considered in In Re Harrell, the Warriors’ agreement suggests that the
right to purchase season tickets for the seasons that would follow a
bankruptcy filing is guaranteed.134 Furthermore, the fact that the Warriors
currently have 43,000 people on their waitlist evidences that there would
be significant and identifiable value stemming from the possibility of
jumping this line.135 It is a fair assumption that the Golden State Warriors’
legal team confirmed that the conditions in their PSL are valid under
California contract law. Since the right for a PSL purchaser to be given the
option to purchase Warriors season tickets is guaranteed for every season,
it is unlikely that a court within the Ninth Circuit would find this property
interest to have no value under California property law.136
The Warriors’ PSL offering also does not contain a firm nontransferability clause that could lead to a court bound by the Ninth Circuit
to find that the PSL contains no value for the estate.137 Chicago Board of
Trade once more requires that the trustee gain no additional rights than
those the debtor possessed under the original agreement.138 If the debtor
was unable to transfer the seat, neither could the trustee. In this scenario,
the Warriors would be under no obligation to honor its PSL obligations as
to the eventual purchaser from the trustee’s sale. The PSL is thus worthless
if it becomes owned by anyone but the initial purchaser. The trustee would
have no other option than to find this type of PSL to be of inconsequential
value to the estate. As a result, the PSL once again returns to the possession
of the now bankrupt debtor. This scenario places the Warriors in a nonideal position. Seemingly, each subsequent year, the Warriors would be
at the mercy of having to wait and see whether the bankrupt debtor can
find the solvency to pay for the next season before being able to find a
replacement customer to recoup value. Importantly, the purchaser who is
now bankrupt already fulfilled their obligations under the PSL by paying
the initial fee. Accordingly, the bankruptcy purchase faces no risk of
absolving the agreement by default.
On the other hand, if the Warriors had no conditions on their
transferability clause, then the trustee could seemingly sell the
“membership” to any individual who offered the most value for the benefit
134
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of the estate. This arguably harms the Warriors in three main ways. First,
this does a disservice to their long waitlist, which results in a wave of
negative publicity. Second, the estate—not the Warriors—would be in the
position to recoup all of the available proceeds that could be acquired on
the market for the membership sale. Lastly, arena security came into more
focus than ever before as a result of a series of unfortunate recent incidents.
Of particular note is the recent suicide bombing that occurred at an Ariana
Grande concert at the Manchester Arena in 2017, which resulted in the
deaths of twenty-two concert goers.139 To ensure the safety of all game
attendees, it is in the best interest of the Warriors to know and control who
can enter their arena. This concern is further heightened when certain
individuals are in attendance for every Warriors home game. Currently, the
prevalence of secondary market sales for single game tickets on sites such
as Stubhub140 or SeatGeek141 made knowing everyone who is in the
building for a game difficult. However, being able to do so is an
aspirational goal for sports teams in the future and must be considered in
light of the Warriors’ PSL containing a thirty-year lifespan.
The Warriors avoided these issues by instead including the
provision that they “will control all transfers, or sales of memberships, on
their own marketplace” in their PSL agreements.142 Following Supreme
Court precedent143 and the bankruptcy code,144 this provision will continue
to attach to the Warriors’ “membership” in the case it were to become an
asset of a bankruptcy estate. The importance of this is that it avoids all of
the undesirable issues outlined above as the effect of this provision is that
the PSL provides some value as to not be found inconsequential to the
estate. Thus, the PSL would not remain subject to the now bankrupt
individual. The PSL further provides that, in addition to the sale having to
place on the marketplace controlled by the Warriors, “Members will have
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the opportunity to sell their membership to a third party, for an amount not
to exceed their initial investment.”145
Importantly, though, there is no limitation to what price the
Warriors could receive from this sale. The market dictates this. A waitlist
of 43,000 suggests that the current price would largely exceed the initial.
By contract, all value above the initial price is for the sole enjoyment of
the Warriors organization. They ensured that as each individual or
corporation, startup or otherwise, enters into bankruptcy liquidation their
membership no longer applies to an insolvent, will be sold to a person of
their choice and at a value that they receive the greatest benefit. The
occurrence of the number of purchaser bankruptcy filings will not be
insignificant over a thirty-year lifespan.
The Warriors, in effect, presented an opportunity for subsequent
NBA teams to now deploy their own future PSL offerings. However, the
amount of leverage each team may have in contracting favorable terms
differs based on the surrounding circumstances. As addressed in the
background portion of this paper, the Warriors enjoy a number of favorable
factors that place them in a position of significant leverage in the
contracting process. The Warriors were in a position that allowed them to
contract for complete control over the sale or transfer of one of these
memberships from the outset of the agreement. Once more, the waitlist
contains 43,000 potential purchasers. For the Warriors, these provisions
are not triggered on the occurrence of any event. They come into effect as
soon as the PSL is enforceable onto the parties.
Future small-market teams implementing a PSL likely will be
unable to enjoy the advantages the Bay Area provides. There are not many
locations that contain such wealth and scale of well-financed corporations
nearby. These teams likely would find themselves unsuccessful in
implementing such strenuous provisions onto their purchasers. It may also
be of importance as to what the PSL is funding. For example, there may be
significant excitement in the community that results in increased demand
for an expansion team that proposes to enter a smaller market for the first
time, as evidenced by the events in Charlotte.146 The effect of this may be
that the organization has comparable leverage to the Warriors in order
implement similar terms in a licensing agreement that guarantees a seat
for a number of years. In most instances that a PSL will be implemented
though organizations will consider an already existing team in a market
145
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proposing a PSL for the purpose of helping fund construction of a new
arena. In a small market, the leverage equation would likely shift in the
opposite direction.
The Warriors left their previous home of the less affluent Oakland
to move across the bay in large part because the demographics of their
new location in San Francisco allowed them to price their PSL to a level at
which they could rely on private financing.147 Resultingly, they were for
the most part able to avoid the outcry that often occurs when a team only
pays a small portion for the construction of a new stadium while leaving
taxpayers to foot the majority of the bill. The Warriors’ ability to charge
such a high price in their PSL is in addition to these subsequent conditions
they included in the agreement that are the subject of this article.148
This additional context speaks to the magnitude of the leverage that the
Warriors enjoy.
To almost every other NBA team, the idea of making fans pay a
substantial fee for the right to be able to buy tickets is substantially outside
the scope of reason. Their PSL offerings almost assuredly need to account
for the actual tickets before the subsequent conditions of the agreement are
even considered. For many NBA cities, the different options such as season
tickets to the cities other sports teams are comparable in terms of value to
what the NBA team offers. Unlike the Warriors, such a need for these
tickets for some individuals and corporations simply does not exist in other
cities. Most purchasers, especially corporations, will also likely retain an
attorney to go over the agreement before paying what would be a large
sum to them. Some level of negotiation and red-lining will likely take
place between these potential purchasers and the team. The Warriors
seemingly did not have to face this. The likelihood of the NBA team being
able to hold onto these provisions is not very high. However, these teams
should take note from the Warriors and implement these provisions with a
trigger that bears no consequence onto the purchaser but would for the
team.
In sum, a classification can be made as to three levels for leverage
future sports teams have for what terms and conditions they place on a
successful PSL offering. The first and highest level is for teams that enjoy
conditions similar to the Warriors. The next level is for teams that enjoy
similar leverage to the Warriors due to the specific circumstances
147
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surrounding the PSL offering. The most likely scenario here would be an
expansion team entering a new market. The third and most prevalent level
concerns teams that are in a position of having considerably less leverage
than the Warriors had for their PSL offering.
IV.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE NBA FRANCHISES
IMPLEMENTING A PSL FINANCING

The lesson is clear for teams that find themselves in the position
of being in the first or second level in terms of the leverage they have for
their PSL offering. These teams should mirror their offerings by the closest
proximity possible to those of the provisions discussed in this article
implemented in the Warriors offering. The best possible scenario for all
teams is for these provisions to be given full effect from the outset of their
relationship with the PSL purchaser coming into existence. For the
majority of teams, however, the trigger that should be added onto these
provisions in future PSLs is as follows. Importantly, the result for these
teams would be avoiding the undesirable circumstance of the Phoenix
Suns arising from In re Harrel.149
As to what this specific trigger could be, § 541(c) of the bankruptcy
code bears large significance.150 This provision of the bankruptcy code
makes any contractual provision unenforceable upon a bankruptcy filing
that is:
[C]onditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of
the debtor, on the commencement of a case under this
title, or on the appointment of or taking possession by a
trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such
commencement, and that affects or gives an option to
effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the
debtor’s interest in property.151
The added trigger thus must fall outside of the scope of conditions
541(c) and deemed as ineffective upon a bankruptcy filing and result in
being stripped as applying to the from PSL. At the same time, however, the
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trigger should also take into account how purchasers and their attorneys
would react when presented with a sales pitch.
Upon consideration of all the various aspects, future teams in
this latter category should implement the following trigger onto the new
provisions introduced in the Warriors PSL: “purchaser’s creditors have
gained legal entitlement by a judicial proceeding to sell the seat license
subject to this agreement.”
As to the 541(c) issue, this provision is outside of its scope
because it is a trigger that occurs often outside of bankruptcy and
insolvency. Notably, it would trigger in the event of a non-bankruptcy
foreclosure sale over the PSL. Secured transactions undergo such sales in
significant frequency and often do not concern an insolvent party. In fact,
it would occur probably more often here than it would in bankruptcy.
Thus, 541(c) should not be of issue.
Also, purchasers should have no issue with this trigger as the
occurrence of said trigger taking place—the purchaser likely already lost
their rights to the PSL anyway. The purchaser who defaulted with the PSL
as collateral likely would be unable to redeem and prevent a foreclosure
sale. Season tickets to a sports team are also likely not of much concern in
the face of bankruptcy for the filer. Thus, teams should not face any
roadblocks in implementing this suggestion in their future PSL offerings.
It is always best to be safe than sorry as evidenced by the crippling
recession of the late 2000s. Teams should take advantage of the growing
interest in the NBA in their financing schemes to the level they can.
Including this provision in a future PSL can only serve as a benefit to a
team. Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity; higher courts are often not as
experienced in bankruptcy law and may be subject to manipulation by the
parties. NBA teams should protect themselves by specifically contracting
for these outcomes in the event of a future purchaser’s bankruptcy
liquidation.
In conclusion, future NBA teams should follow the Warriors’ lead
and implement marketplace and sales restrictions to the extent their
leverage over purchasers allows in future PSL offerings. At the very least,
every team should implement these provisions with the proposed trigger
above to address concerns arising from a future purchaser’s filing for
bankruptcy liquidation.
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